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Promoting Access to HIV/AIDS
Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa




Approximately thirty-four million people in the world are
infected with the HIV/AIDS virus.' Cases are growing fastest in
the developing world, with the African continent being hit the
hardest by the pandemic.2 Exacerbating the effects of HIV/AIDS,
one-third of the world population and fifty percent of the
population in parts of sub-Saharan Africa do not have access to
essential medicines.3 Furthermore, ninety-five percent of people
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University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1998. Special thanks to Professor Jim Chen for
his guidance. I also want to thank my family and friends, especially Jim and
Connie Schug and Jordan Anderson, for supporting and encouraging me to
participate in the Howard University legal studies program in Cape Town, South
Africa in the Summer of 2000. That experience provided me the human dimension
necessary to undertake this project. Finally, thanks to the Journal for its
commitment to making the final product the best it could be.
1. See Press Release, UNAIDS, AIDS is Key Issue for New Century, On Par
with Globalization, Peace, Environment, http://www.unaids.org/whatsnew/
press/eng/london040900.html (Sept. 4, 2000) (reporting that 34.3 million people
globally are living with HIV/AIDS); see also Estimates of Cumulative HIVIAIDS
Infections and AIDS Deaths and Number of Reported AIDS Cases, 1996 Stat. Y.B.
43, U.N. Sales No. E/F.98.XVII.1 [hereinafter Estimates of Cumulative HIV/AIDS
Infections] (stating that the estimated cumulative number of HIV/AIDS infections,
AIDS deaths, and people newly infected with HIV in 1997 was approximately 30.6
million people worldwide). HIV is an acronym for the human immuno virus. AIDS
is an acronym for acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.
2. See Estimates of Cumulative HIV/AIDS Infections, supra note 1 (reporting
that, of the estimated 126,191 new cases reported to the World Health
Organization in 1997, approximately half (61,232) were in Africa); see also Anne-
Valerie Kaninda, Remarks at the World AIDS Day Teleconference,
http:/lwww.doctorswithoutborders.org/newslwad2000transcript.htm (Nov. 28,
2000) (noting that of the approximately thirty-six million people infected with AIDS
worldwide, twenty-five million live in sub-Saharan Africa).
3. See World Health Org., Drug Management and Supply Strategies,
http:llwww.who.int/medicines/teams/pardrug-managementand-supply-strat.html
(last visited Mar. 4, 2001); see also Medecins Sans Frontieres Campaign for Access
to Essential Medicines, Improving Access to Medicines: Rising to the Challenge,
http://www.accessmed-msf.org (June 2000) [hereinafter Improving Access to
Medicines] (stating that disadvantaged patients without access to health care often
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with AIDS worldwide do not have access to any HIV/AIDS
treatment. 4 The devastation to sub-Saharan Africa has begun. 5
The resultant situation will affect not only sub-Saharan Africa,
but also the entire world.6
To address the crisis, the U.N. Security Council conducted a
session in January 2000 on AIDS in Africa.7 Of the 4086 times the
Council has met, this was the first time the topic of the meeting
was a health issue, reflecting the magnitude of the crisis.8 Former
Vice President Al Gore spoke at the meeting and noted that AIDS
"is a security crisis-because it threatens not just individual
citizens, but the very institutions that define and defend the
character of a society."9 He described the dramatic impact of AIDS
on sub-Saharan Africa: it "weakens workforces and saps economic
strength. AIDS strikes at teachers, and denies education to their
students. It strikes at the military, and subverts the forces of
order and peacekeeping."'10
Many factors contribute to the lack of availability of
pharmaceuticals in the developing world. Of these factors,
absence of production, lack of research, and prohibitive prices play
significant roles." U.S. patent law and the World Trade
Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
receive a death sentence as a result of the high cost and lack of availability of
medicines).
4. See Improving Access to Medicines, supra note 3.
5. See Sarah Boseley, Call to Africans: Fight to Free the Young from AIDS,
GUARDIAN (England), July 13, 2000, at 14 (stating that one in three women and one
in seven men aged fifteen to twenty-four in Botswana are HIV positive and that six
people under the age of twenty-four are infected every minute).
6. See id. (quoting Carol Bellany, Unicefs Executive Director, as stating that
AIDS in Africa "is very dangerously eroding already very fragile social structures");
see also Permitting Patent Infringements to Combat AIDS, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 541,
542 (Sean D. Murphy ed., 2000) (stating that it is in the interest of the United
States to take all reasonable steps to prevent the further spread of infectious
diseases, especially HIV/AIDS).
7. See Richard C. Holbrooke, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Statement for the




9. Al Gore, Vice President of the United States, Remarks as Prepared for




11. See Improving Access to Medicines, supra note 3 (adding that a lack of
infrastructure and logistics, a lack of good quality production, and irrational drug
choice also impact accessibility).
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Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) 12 function to keep
the prices of drugs high and require countries to respect
intellectual property rights, often at the expense of promoting
access to essential pharmaceuticals.13  Former President Bill
Clinton took a new stance on the situation in May 2000 when he
issued Executive Order 13,155.14 The Executive Order provides
that the United States will not seek to revoke or revise any
intellectual property law or policy of a beneficiary sub-Saharan
African country that regulates HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or
medical technologies.' 5 However, it is unclear whether Executive
Order 13,155 has promoted access to these drugs in a meaningful
way. 16 The World Health Organization (WHO) has also offered
possible solutions to the problem, stating that providing adequate
financing, affordable pricing, and a reliable supply system are all
critical to making pharmaceuticals available.' 7 To effectively
combat the disease, the United States, the pharmaceutical
companies, the governments of developing nations, and financial
institutions must make a concerted effort to make essential
12. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
13. See AIDS Drugs: Activists March on White House, NAT'L. J. GROUP, INC.,
Dec. 1, 1999, LEXIS, American Health Line (reporting that activists allege U.S.
policy puts the concerns of drug companies ahead of the public health by
prohibiting compulsory licensing that would allow developing countries to
manufacture their own, less-costly HIV treatments); see also Integrated Reg'l Info.
Network, Africa-AIDS: IRIN Focus on Drug Debate,
http://www.aegis.com/news/irin/2000/IR000705.html (July 11, 2000) (arguing that
drug companies have used international intellectual property law to maintain
"their stranglehold on the development, manufacture, distribution, and pricing of
AIDS drugs," but also noting that allowing infringement of intellectual property
rights in the developing world would undermine companies' ability to fund
research).
14. See Exec. Order No. 13,155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30, 521 (May 10, 2000).
15. See id. § 1(a)(1)-(2) (providing further that such revocations or revisions of
any intellectual property law or policy of a beneficiary sub-Saharan African country
will not be sought as long as the policies promote access to HIV/AIDS
pharmaceuticals for affected populations of a sub-Saharan African country and
provide adequate and effective intellectual property protection consistent with the
TRIPS Agreement).
16. See id. § 3(b) C'This order is intended only to improve the internal
management of the executive branch and is not intended to, and does not create,
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a
party against the United States ....").
17. See Michael Scholtz, Executive Director Health Technology and
Pharmaceuticals World Health Organization, International Trade Agreements and
Public Health: WHO's Role, Address at the Conference on Increasing Access to
Essential Drugs in a Globalized Economy, http://www.who.int.medicines.docs/
wto-public.health-amsterdam-ms.html (Nov. 25-26, 1999).
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medicines and medical technology available to persons affected by
the HIV/AIDS virus.18
This Note focuses on how HIV/AIDS virus is affecting sub-
Saharan Africa and argues that the United States, in collaboration
with the pharmaceutical industry and various international
organizations, must take affirmative steps toward promoting
access to essential medicines. 19 Part I gives an overview of the
complex issues involved in approaching this subject. It identifies
the population affected and the severity of the AIDS crisis, and
describes the recent medical advances that have greatly increased
the chances of survival for persons living with the HIV/AIDS
virus.20 It also examines laws that are involved, including the
TRIPS Agreement, U.S. patent law, and Executive Order 13,155.21
Finally, Part I looks at the role of the WHO, the U.N., and the
World Bank in breaking down the barriers that inhibit access to
essential medicines. 22
Part II seeks to offer a practical solution to the current
situation. It addresses the possible measures that can be taken
while still adequately protecting intellectual property rights.23 It
argues that pharmaceutical companies and those who regulate
them owe a greater duty to society to promote the general
welfare. 24 Thus, the pharmaceutical industry should not inhibit
access to medical treatment and pharmaceuticals for millions of
suffering people.25
This Note concludes that affirmative steps can and must be
taken to provide access to medications in the area of the world
most affected by the HIV/AIDS crisis. These steps include
compulsory and voluntary licensing, parallel importing, and
generic manufacturing within the framework of international
intellectual property law.26  Promoting access to essential
18. See Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director-General World Health Organization,
Remarks at the WHO/Public Interest NGO Pharmaceuticals Roundtable, 3d
Meeting, http://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/2000/2000050 lngo.html
(May 1, 2000); see also Gore, supra note 9 (calling for an initiative for an expanded
public-private partnership in the battle against AIDS).
19. See Improving Access to Medicines, supra note 3 (stating that action must
be coordinated with three entities: the WHO, the pharmaceutical industry, and
patient groups and doctors).
20. See discussion infra Parts I.A-B.
21. See discussion infra Part I.C.
22. See discussion infra Part I.D.
23. See discussion infra Part II.A.
24. See discussion infra Parts II.B, III.
25. See discussion infra Part II.B.
26. See discussion infra Parts II.A, III.
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pharmaceuticals requires cooperation between various groups,
industries, and governments. 27 Although all of these entities have
different goals, it is indisputable that the political, social, and
economic instability of sub-Saharan Africa, which is certain to
accompany the HIV/AIDS crisis, will impact the entire world. 28
I. Background
Understanding the HIV/AIDS crisis and its possible solutions
requires background information in various and complex areas.
Increasing access to essential medicines requires the initiative of
the pharmaceutical industry,29  cooperation between the
governments of the developed and the developing world,30 and an
understanding of international law and its treatment of
intellectual property rights. 31
A. The HIV/AIDS Crisis and Its Impact on Africa
The HIV/AIDS virus has become a leading health concern in
sub-Saharan Africa.3 2 Rates of infection and death in this region
are three times what was projected ten years ago.33 It is currently
estimated that twenty-five million people in sub-Saharan Africa
are infected with the virus.34 Almost three million people died of
AIDS in 1999, marking the highest death rate since the explosion
of the epidemic fifteen years ago. 35
The dramatic rates of infection are attributed partially to
ignorance surrounding how HIV/AIDS is transmitted and the
27. See discussion infra Part III.
28. See discussion infra Part III.
29. See Brundtland, supra note 18 (stating that pharmaceutical companies are
important partners).
30. See id. (stating that in order to promote access, governments of
industrialized countries must lead the way, but governments of developing
countries must do their share by facilitating access to financing, importation,
purchasing, and distribution).
31. See id.
32. See Providing HIV Drugs to Developing Countries; Hope on the Horizon?,
MARKETLETTER, July 24, 2000, LEXIS, Marketletter Publications Ltd. [hereinafter
Providing HIV Drugs] (noting that there are sixteen African countries in which
more than ten percent of the adult population aged fifteen to forty-nine is infected
with the HIV virus).
33. See id.
34. See Kaninda, supra note 2; Medecins Sans Frontieres, HIV/AIDS: World
AIDS Day Fact Sheet, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/wad2000.htm
Oast visited Mar. 4, 2001).
35. See Interpreter of Maladies - AIDS in the Developing World, HINDU, July
20, 2000, 2000 WL 23317621.
Law and Inequality
nature of the disease. 36 Young people are most vulnerable to
infection, due in part to these myths. 37 In some cultures, young
girls lack the negotiating skills to ensure condom usage and are
often prey to older men offering gifts for sex. 38 Moreover, many
young people, particularly girls, do not believe they are at risk and
do not know that someone who looks healthy could be infected
with the virus.39 Furthermore, some men appear to believe that
having sex with a virgin can rid them of the HIV infection. 40
The HIV/AIDS virus exacerbates the problems that many
developing countries face 41 because of the substantial negative
impact on economic growth.4 2 Young adults are a driving force in
the economies of developing nations. However, a staggering
number have died prematurely from AIDS, 43 causing a devastating
economic effect on the countries.44 As a result, the stability of the
36. See Boseley, supra note 5, at 14; see also Foreign AIDS Crisis, HARPER'S,
Dec. 2000, at 23, 23-26 (transcript of a September 5, 2000 interview on South
Africa's Radio 702 with South African Health Minister, Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang) (relaying how Tshabalala-Msimang refuses to acknowledge or accept the
proposition that HIV causes AIDS).
37. See Boseley, supra note 5, at 14.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See Kate Stanley, Where Shame Would Silence Others, She Speaks Out,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 8, 2000, at A35 (noting that the "virgin cure" tale is
to blame for the rape and infection of the very young and that curbing the spread of
AIDS requires dispelling the myth).
41. See Todd M. Rowe, Global Technology Protection: Moving Past the Treaty, 4
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 107, 131 (2000) C'Presently, countries considered to
be underdeveloped lack sufficient resources to provide their citizens with
necessities, including health care, education, food, and clothing.").
42. See World Bank, Africa-Multi-Sector HIV/AIDS Program, Report No.
PID9365, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/cgi-bin/cqc (July 27, 2000) (estimating
that twenty African countries pay an annual cost in per capita growth of at least
0.4 percentage points because of AIDS).
43. See Carmen Perez-Cases et al., Setting Objectives: Is There a Political Will?,
Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines HIV/AIDS Medicines Pricing Report,
http://www.accessmed-msf.org Medecins Sans Frontieres (July 6, 2000) (estimating
that thirteen million children around the world have lost their mother or both
parents to AIDS); see also Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2001 (Magazine), at 26, 26 (noting that a fifteen-year-old in South Africa has more
than a fifty percent chance of dying of AIDS); World Bank, supra note 42
(estimating that eleven million African children have been orphaned by AIDS).
44. See World Bank, supra note 42 ("AIDS dismantles the very foundations of
development. Because it weakens and kills adults in the prime of their lives as
workers and parents, it erodes productivity, decimates the workforce, depletes the
skills base, consumes savings, orphans children, and radically changes the
structure of households.").
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sub-Saharan African region is greatly jeopardized. 45 "As they lose
their productive citizens, the nations themselves face colapse."46
Finally, global trade in general will suffer if the HIV/AIDS
crisis causes the collapse of the African market.47 The developed
world insisted upon the strengthening of intellectual property
rights under the TRIPS Agreement. 48 For example, the United
States forced the developing countries to acquiesce in the
establishment of higher intellectual property standards by
conditioning access to the U.S. market on acceptance of the higher
standards. 49 Thus, the developing countries were coerced to take
into account what they could gain through exports of other
products by offering concessions on intellectual property rights.50
Relaxing the TRIPS Agreement in the area of HIV/AIDS
pharmaceuticals could help protect the basic framework of global
trade by preventing the economic collapse of developing nations,
including those in sub-Saharan Africa.
B. Recent Medical Advances
There is no cure for AIDS; nonetheless, recent medical
developments have demonstrated a prolongation of life by the use
of certain antiviral therapies. 5' Although patients are not
considered cured of AIDS, two to three years of viral suppression
may rid the body of HIV.52 This treatment plan has reduced
AIDS-related mortality by over seventy percent in developed
countries. 53 However, unlike in most industrialized countries, up
to ninety percent of the medicines are "out-of-pocket" expenses for
individuals in the developing world.54 Because the cost of drug
45. See id.
46. Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 26.
47. See Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPS: Background, Principles and General
Provisions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT 3, 8 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998) [hereinafter
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE] (explaining that developing
nations had to agree upon the enforcement of intellectual property standards under
the TRIPS Agreement to maintain global trade relations).
48. See id.
49. See id. at 8-9.
50. See id.
51. See Alexander Scriabine, Discovery and Development of Major Drugs
Currently in Use, in PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION; REVOLUTIONIZING HUMAN
HEALTH 148, 175-76 (Ralph Landau et al. eds., 1999) (identifying a combination of
drugs and protease inhibitors that is capable of reducing, often to nondetectable
levels, the virus levels in the blood).
52. See id.
53. See Perez-Cases et al., supra note 43.
54. See Scholtz, supra note 17; see also Robyn Tamblyn et al., Adverse Events
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therapy is staggering to an individual living in sub-Saharan
Africa, the majority of those infected with HIV/AIDS go
untreated.55  For example, Kenya's per capita gross national
product is $360 per year. 56 The average price for an annual course
of anti-AIDS triple therapy is $15,000.57 Thus, the cost of the
triple antiretroviral therapy is about thirty times the average
monthly salary of a Kenyan.58 Because the cost prohibits access to
treatment, the recent advancements in antiviral therapy have
done little to retard the course of the disease in developing
nations. Recognizing this, the WHO has left certain drugs that
treat HIV off of its Model List of Essential Drugs.59
C. The Role of Law in Access to Medication
1. The TRIPS Agreement
The purpose of the TRIPS Agreement is "to narrow the gaps
in the way [intellectual property rights] are protected
internationally, and to bring them under common international
rules." 60 Through the TRIPS Agreement, the WTO requires
countries to give protection to intellectual property.61  The
Agreement requires that patent protection for inventions be
available for at least twenty years, 62 and establishes jurisdiction
over international enforcement of intellectual property rights.63
Associated with Prescription Drug Cost-Sharing Among Poor and Elderly Persons,
285 JAMA 421, 422 (2001) (noting that in 1996 the Canadian province of Quebec
attempted to enhance equity of access to prescription drugs by passing legislation
making drug insurance mandatory for all residents).
55. See Integrated Reg'l Info. Network, supra note 13 (recognizing that the drug
therapy is beyond the reach of most Africans because the majority of people earn
less than one U.S. dollar per day); see also discussion supra Part L.A (describing the
devastating impact of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa).
56. See Medecins Sans Frontieres, supra note 34.
57. See id.; Integrated Reg'l Info. Network, supra note 13.
58. See Medecins Sans Frontieres, supra note 34.
59. See Perez-Cases et al., supra note 43 (stating that one criteria for the
WHO's Model List of Essential Drugs is reasonable price, which HIV drugs do not
meet).
60. World Trade Org., Trading into the Future: The Introduction to the WTO,
The Agreements, Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement,
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/whatis e/tif e/agrm6_e.htm (last visited Mar.
4, 2001) (recognizing that, as intellectual property became more important in trade,
differences in the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights became
a source of tension in international economic relations).
61. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12.
62. See World Trade Org., supra note 60.
63. See Sarah M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPS
Agreement: Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 941, 946-47
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Although proponents of the TRIPS Agreement predicted that it
would also benefit developing countries in the long run,64
developed countries clearly are the primary beneficiaries. 65
Specifically, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry greatly benefits
from the Agreement. 66 It uses the Agreement to enforce the
protection of U.S. drug patents abroad, thereby yielding greater
profits.67  Moreover, the pharmaceutical industry is very
influential on U.S. policy by substantially supporting and lobbying
both Republicans and Democrats. 68
The traditional rationale for a patent system is that society
benefits from innovations, and the best way to promote research
and development is to grant exclusive rights to patent holders. 69
Applying this rationale, the pharmaceutical companies contend
that exclusive rights are necessary to protect their substantial
investment in research and development. 70 However, money for
research and development often comes from sources outside the
pharmaceutical company itself.71 For example, a study of new
(2000).
64. See Ford, supra note 63, at 946 (noting that although TRIPS would initially
cost developing countries money, it speculatively would have long-term benefits
which include promoting the emergence of pharmaceutical industries in developing
countries and ultimately reducing the cost of pharmaceuticals).
65. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 4, U.N. Sales No. 96.II.D.10 (1996).
66. See Integrated Reg'l Info. Network, supra note 13 (stating that the drug
companies "have used international intellectual property law to maintain their
stranglehold on the development, manufacture, distribution and pricing of AIDS
drugs"); see also Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 28 (noting that under the TRIPS
Agreement, manufacturers receive a twenty-year monopoly to sell the patented
drug in nations at whatever price they choose).
67. See Integrated Reg'l Info. Network, supra note 13; see also Rosenberg, supra
note 43, at 28.
68. See Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 58 (noting that the industry spends about
$75 million in lobbying every year). The industry closely monitored and influenced
the negotiations for the TRIPS Agreement. See Integrated Reg'l Info. Network,
supra note 13.
69. See David Benjamin Snyder, South Africa's Medicines and Related
Substances Control Amendment Act: A Spoonful of Sugar or a Bitter Pill to
Swallow?, 18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 175, 188-89 (1999).
70. See Intellectual Property: UN-Backed Group Says TRIPS Agreement Puts
Company Profits Above Human Rights, BNA INT'L TRADE DAILY, Aug. 22, 2000, WL
8/22/2000 BTD d3 [hereinafter Intellectual Property]; Integrated Reg'l Info.
Network, supra note 13; see also Sabra Chatrand, Patents: In Health Emergencies,
Brazil Allows Copying of Drugs, to the Dismay of American Companies, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2001, at C8 (stating that the pharmaceutical industry claims that the cost
of research for a new drug is $500 million).
71. See Integrated Reg'l Info. Network, supra note 13; see also Trans Atl.
Consumer Dialogue, Recommendations on Health Care and Intellectual Property,
http://www.tacd.org/pharmf.html (last updated Mar. 8, 2000) (recommending that
U.S. consumers and policy makers obtain better information about pharmaceutical
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antiretroviral drugs studied by the international organization,
Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders), found that
five of the six drug companies involved received public funding. 72
By receiving public funds for research and development, the
pharmaceutical companies' argument that they need exclusive
patent protection to recover their investment in research and
development is tenuous.
Although patents are highly profitable to many groups in the
developed world, the developing world views them quite
differently.73 Because the pharmaceutical industry sets its own
research and development priorities, marketing forces are a
deciding factor in how resources are allocated.7 4 The development
of medicines is motivated by corporate profit in the developed
world and consequently neglects global public health concerns,
particularly those of the developing world.75 Recognizing this
reality, some developing countries have determined that their
citizens will benefit more from not patenting certain essential
inventions, especially medicines. 76
2. Impact of the Enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement
Enforcing a patent abroad has the practical effect of
prohibiting four mechanisms which lower prices of
pharmaceuticals in developing countries: compulsory licensing,
voluntary licensing, parallel importing, and generic
manufacturing.7 7 The difficulty in using these mechanisms is
economics to ensure that the drug companies can truly justify their argument that
protecting research and development is necessary to promote innovation; this can
be done by obtaining data on global revenues, cost of clinical trials, and the role of
government in the development of the drug).
72. See Integrated Reg'l Info. Network, supra note 13; see also Rosenberg, supra
note 43, at 31 (stating that some pharmaceutical companies manufacturing AIDS
drugs did not invent the drug or discover its use in AIDS therapy, and that some of
the drugs were developed using grants from the U.S. government); see also Trans
Atl. Consumer Dialogue, supra note 71.
73. See Intellectual Property, supra note 70 (reporting that a U.N. body
criticized the TRIPS Agreement for giving exclusive rights to pharmaceutical
companies, which allows the companies to set high prices for new drugs, thus
making the drugs unaffordable and inaccessible for the poor).
74. See Integrated Reg'l Info. Network, supra note 13.
75. See id.
76. See Snyder, supra note 69, at 180 (noting that some developing countries,
refuse to allow patents for newly developed medicines because they believe that the
cost to their economies would be too great or the prices of important discoveries
would be prohibitive for their citizens).
77. See Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 28 (stating that enforcing a patent abroad
functions to keep the prices of pharmaceuticals high and arguing that the
pharmaceutical companies' solution is ineffective).
[Vol. 19:229
2001] ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS PHARMACEUTICALS 239
that, depending on the circumstances in which they are used, they
may be considered a violation of patent protection pursuant to the
TRIPS Agreement. 78
Compulsory licensing has been used to try to lower prices.
"Compulsory licensing would involve the government of a
developing country issuing licenses to local firms to manufacture
lower cost, generic versions of expensive, patented HIV/AIDS
drugs."79 Before a government can grant a compulsory license, the
TRIPS Agreement requires that it must attempt to acquire a
voluntary license from the patent holder.8 0 A request for a
voluntary license must be made on reasonable terms, within a
reasonable time, and include an offer to pay adequate
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into
account the economic value of the license.8 1
Parallel importing can also provide medications at lower
prices.8 2 Also known as gray market goods, parallel imports are
"goods which are bought in a foreign market by an independent
third party, and then resold in (another] market to compete with
authorized distributors."83 This system decreases prices by forcing
the original manufacturer that sells a product abroad to compete
with its own product; the product is imported directly from the
manufacturer, as well as from wholesalers in other countries who
78. See David P. Fidler, Neither Science Nor Shamans: Globalization of Markets
and Health in the Developing World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191, 210 (1999)
(reporting that the TRIPS Agreement allows compulsory licensing of patents in
certain situations); see also U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 65, at
30 (providing that compulsory licenses are available under the TRIPS Agreement'
subject to their detailed conditions set forth in the Agreement (Article 31)); Trans
Atl. Consumer Dialogue, supra note 70 (recommending that governments of the
United States and the European Union (EU) should neither bring trade sanctions
against poor countries who use parallel imports to obtain cheaper access to
pharmaceuticals nor prohibit the use of compulsory licenses when they are issued
in compliance with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement).
79. Fidler, supra note 78, at 210-11.
80. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. XXXI para. (b); see also World
Trade Org., Overview: The TRIPS Agreement,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/TRIPSe/ intel2_e.htm (last visited Mar. 4,
2001); Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 52 (indicating that the United States has
recently issued compulsory licenses in situations that are far less dire than the
AIDS crisis, including tow trucks, stainless-steel wheels, and corn seeds, and that
compulsory licenses are also common in antitrust cases).
81. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. XXXI, para. (b); see also World
Trade Org., supra note 80.
82. See Snyder, supra note 69, at 181, 196 (noting that parallel imports may
drastically lower prices of drugs by increasing competition and pressuring
companies to lower prices).
83. Id. at 180 (quoting Hillary A. Kremen, Caveat Venditor: International
Application of the First Sale Doctrine, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 161 (1997)).
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pay less for the product initially.84 Because parallel imports
decrease prices through increased competition, they have obvious
potential benefits for consumers.8 5
Finally, generic manufacturing of pharmaceuticals lowers
prices by allowing a different manufacturer to make the exact
pharmaceutical and introduce it into the market, thereby
increasing competition. 86 However, it can only legally take place
after a patent expires or when the drug is not under patent
protection. 87 Implementation of initiatives to manufacture generic
AIDS drugs has proven successful in Brazil.88 The price of AIDS
drugs has fallen eighty percent since the Brazilian government
authorized production of generic drugs.8 9 The price of the same
drugs fell only nine percent between 1996 and 2000 before Brazil
undertook the manufacturing of the generic versions. 90
Not surprisingly, the pharmaceutical industry rejects the
implementation of these measures and favors a strict
interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement that limits or even
prohibits the use of compulsory or voluntary licensing, parallel
importing, and generic manufacturing. 9 1 It maintains that the
84. See id. at 180-81 (noting that parallel importing is possible because
companies often discriminate in pricing between countries for reasons such as
money spent on advertising and on product support for their goods). Furthermore,
unauthorized dealers exploit currency fluctuations such as buying in a country
where the currency is weak and selling in a country where that currency is strong.
See id.
85. See id.
86. See Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 31 (noting that in Brazil, generic
manufacturing was undertaken by enlisting a chemist to analyze and copy the
world's major AIDS drugs).
87. See Snyder, supra note 69, at 178 (stating that a patent is essentially the
government granting the inventor a monopoly on his or her invention); see also
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., supra note 65, at 30 (providing that a
domestic patent is for a minimum of twenty years after filing).
88. See Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 31 (describing the success of Brazil's
government-initiated program, which produces non-patented protected drugs that
Brazil has the infrastructure to manufacture); see also Integrated Reg'l Info.
Network, supra note 13 (reporting that the price of AIDS drugs has fallen by eighty
percent in Brazil since the government allowed the production of generic drugs).
89. See supra note 88.
90. See supra note 88.
91. See Intellectual Property, supra note 70; see also Sarah Boseley, At the
Mercy of Drug Giants: Millions Struggle with Disease as Pharmaceutical Firms Go
to Court to Protect Profits, GUARDIAN (England), Feb. 12, 2001,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/O,4273,4134799,00.htlm (reporting that
forty-two pharmaceutical companies have taken action in South Africa to block the
South African government from importing cheap medicines). Drug companies have
spent several years and millions of dollars preparing the case. See id.
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development of new drugs costs hundreds of millions of dollars and
that higher prices are necessary to recover their investments.9 2
The pharmaceutical companies' arguments can be repudiated
on several grounds. First, much of the research and development.
costs associated with the development of drugs is subsidized by
public funding.9 3 Second, the improvement of access to AIDS
drugs will not have a large adverse effect on the current structure
of the pharmaceutical industry or its profits.94 The industry has a
projected worth of $406 billion in 2002.95 Of that amount, Africa
will represent just over one percent of the market. 96 Thus, the
pharmaceutical industry will make hundreds of billions of dollars
without relying on the African market. Third, pharmaceutical
companies spend enormous amounts of money marketing their
products, often exceeding dollars spent on research and
development. 97 Marketing in this context is wholly unnecessary. 98
Finally, and most alarming, only two-tenths of a percent of the
total research budget is devoted to those diseases responsible for
eighteen percent of the deaths worldwide. 99 Little research is
required in the context of HIV/AIDS because the triple therapy
course has already been developed. 100 Therefore, promoting access
is the primary task at hand, and it does not involve the
expenditure of large amounts of money for research and
development or marketing.
The United States has traditionally interpreted the TRIPS
Agreement strictly and has considered certain practices of
developing countries relating to pharmaceuticals as violations of
92. See supra note 70.
93. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text (arguing that the
pharmaceutical industry's argument that patents are needed to protect its
investment on research and development is dubious).
94. See Providing HIV Drugs, supra note 32.
95. See id.
96. See id.; see also Integrated Reg'l Info. Network, supra note 13 (quoting
Daniel Berman, coordinator of Doctors Without Borders Access to Essential
Medicines Campaign, "Africa currently only represents one percent of the world-
wide drug market .... Companies can survive and prosper if prices are lower in
poor countries. More importantly, millions of lives can be saved.").
97. See AIDS Drugs: Activists March on White House, supra note 13 (citing
Bristol-Myers's 1998 annual report, which stated that the company spent more
than sixty-se'en billion on marketing compared to sixteen billion on research).
98. See Scriabine, supra note 51, at 176.
99. See Improving Access to Medicines, supra note 3 (stating that only 0.2% of
the global pharmaceutical research budget, estimated between fifty to sixty billion
dollars, is devoted to acute respiratory infections, tuberculosis, and diarrhoeal
diseases).
100. See Scriabine, supra note 51, at 176.
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the Agreement.' 0 ' For example, several developing countries have
used the issuance of compulsory licenses as a way of reducing the
costs of pharmaceuticals in order to protect the health of their
citizens.' 02 The TRIPS Agreement allows compulsory licensing of
patents in certain situations, but the pharmaceutical companies
and developed countries such as the United States have generally
opposed compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents. 03
In May 2000 the stance of the U.S. government changed,
however, when President Clinton issued Executive Order
13,155.104 The Order provides a more liberal approach to patent
enforcement in sub-Saharan African countries, where policies that
promote access to HIV/AIDS medications have been created.'0 5
The Order followed the President's declaration that AIDS in sub-
Saharan Africa is a threat to U.S. national security.10 6
Fortunately, the Bush Administration has committed to
maintaining the Clinton Administration's generous policy
concerning AIDS drugs for Africa.' 07
This new perspective by the U.S. executive branch has had
some practical effect. Shortly after the issuance of the Order,
101. See Ford, supra note 63, at 952 (discussing a dispute in 1997 between the
United States and South Africa over South Africa's proposed Medicines and
Related Substances Control Amendment Act, which would allow the South African
Health Minister to override patent rights and allow compulsory licensing and
parallel imports); see also AIDS Drugs: Activists March on White House, supra note
13 (noting that President Clinton was criticized at the 1999 WTO meeting for
putting the interests of drug companies ahead of the public health, both in
international trade agreements and WTO negotiations, by threatening sanctions if
manufacture continued under compulsory licenses).
102. See Fidler, supra note 78, at 210-11 ("Compulsory licensing would involve
the government of a developing country issuing licenses to local firms to
manufacture lower cost, generic versions of expensive, patented HIV/AIDS drugs."):
Ford, supra note 63, at 959-60 (noting that the TRIPS Agreement authorizes the
issuance of compulsory licenses in times of national emergency or extreme urgency,
but is ambiguous as to when such a situation arises).
103. See Fidler, supra note 78, at 211.
104. See Exec. Order No. 13,155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521 (May 20, 2000).
105. See id. (alluding to the possibility that the U.S. government's stance on
compulsory licenses has changed in relation to the situation in sub-Saharan Africa;
it may no longer be a violation of the TRIPS Agreement to grant compulsory
licenses in ways that promote access to HIV/AIDS medications for persons in this
region).
106. See Improving Access to Medicines, supra note 3. A threat to public health
and security occurs when effective medicines are unaffordable because it prevents
an appropriate response to public health needs. This problem, in turn, results in
irrational drug use leading to the emergence of drug-resistant micro-organisms
that can spread across the globe as populations move. See id.; see also Gore, supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
107. See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Bush Keeps Clinton Policy on Poor Lands' Need
for AIDS Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2001, at A9.
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multi-national pharmaceutical companies lowered prices of certain
drugs, made donations to developing economies, and promised to
slash prices on other HIV drugs for individuals living in
developing countries. 108 These measures have not been well
received by some African governments, however, because they
overlook the real issue of lowering prices of pharmaceuticals
permanently. 10 9 For example, the South African Development
Community (SADC), an organization of fourteen southern African
countries, disapproves of the proposal because it doubts that any
of the drug donations and vague promises of price reduction will
actually help patients. 110 Instead, the SADC remains committed
to promoting drug access through parallel importing, compulsory
licenses, and generic manufacturing in southern Africa because
these measures could reduce the cost of the triple therapy
treatment there from $15,000 to as little as $200 a year."'
In addition, the current structure of drug donations and price
reductions also require each country to negotiate individually with
each pharmaceutical company offering the donation for each drug
being donated. 112  The country-by-country policy functions to
inhibit the development of more sustainable ways to get
medication to people in need." 3 Thus, little progress has been
made since the promises to lower the prices of HIV drugs. 114
108. See Providing HIV Drugs, supra note 32 (noting that the multi-national
company, Glaxo Wellcome, significantly reduced the price of zidovudine (an
antiretroviral) and that multi-national company, Blehringer Ingelheim, said it
would provide nevirapine (also an antiretroviral) free to developing economies for a
period of five years).
109. See Bernard Pecoul, Taking Our Own Pulse, http://www.accessmed-msf.org
(July 2000) (criticizing the efforts as "not convincing" and stating that "Brazil
should be held up as a model, and its political choices should be promoted by
international organizations that are supposed to be strategically guiding
governments.").
110. See Providing HIV Drugs, supra note 32.
111. See id.
112. See Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 58.
113. See id.
114. See Medicins Sans Frontieres, Six Months After Durban: Have AIDS Drug
Prices for the Poor Been "Slashed?", http://www.doctorswithoutborders.orgt
pr/prl08/htm (Dec. 1, 2000). But see Donald G. McNeil Jr., Indian Company Offers
to Supply AIDS Drugs at Low Cost in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, at A9
(stating that the Indian drug manufacturer, Cipla Ltd., has offered to sell generic
AIDS drugs to African governments for $600 per year per patient, which is $400
less than prices offered by the companies holding the patents).
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D. The Key Players
1. The World Bank
The World Bank is responsible for funding $500 million of the
long-term program to help AIDS patients in Africa." 5 The World
Bank has recently asked African leaders, the private sector, and
society to focus on the HIV/AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa
because AIDS is quickly undoing the development accomplished
over the past thirty years." 6 Although significant, the monetary
support the World Bank has committed is insufficient to address a
problem of such magnitude. Further, it inadequately responded to
the call by UNAIDS, the U.N.'s group dealing with the AIDS
pandemic, for an additional three billion dollars in funding. 117
2. The U.N. and the WHO
The U.N. and the WHO have been instrumental in bringing
the HIV/AIDS crisis to the forefront of the international agenda
and in promoting access to medication. In furthering its mission
to promote peace, human rights, and social justice, 118 the U.N.
created the WHO in 1948.119 The goal of the WHO is for all people
to attain a level of health that permits them to lead socially and
economically productive lives. 120 The development of the WHO
included a blueprint of health that emphasized making essential
medical treatment universally accessible to people by acceptable
means. 121 The blueprint aimed at having full participation at a
cost affordable to each community and country by 2000.122 All of
the WHO's 191 Member States have agreed that health is a
115. See Providing HIVDrugs, supra note 32.
116. See World Bank, World Bank Intensifies Approach to HIVIAIDS Crisis in
Africa, http://www.worldbank.org/htmlltoday/archives/html/sepl3-17-99.htm (Sept.
14, 1999) (providing examples of how AIDS is destroying the human population and
specifically noting that "llife expectancy-the best overall measure of
development-is now declining in a host of African countries, a reversal of the
rapid progress in the years following independence").
117. See Providing HIV Drugs, supra note 32.
118. See Barbara Crossette, Globalization Tops 3-Day U.N. Agenda for World
Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2000, at Al (quoting Debi Barker, deputy director of
the International Forum on Globalization stating, "The U.N.... was really created
to be a space to promote peace, human rights, the environment, social justice,
livelihoods and democracy.").
119. See EDMUND JAN OSMANCZYK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED NATIONS AND
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human right, and are therefore committed to promoting access to
essential drugs. 23
Although the WHO has taken a leading role in promoting
access to medication, their goal for universally accessible primary
health care is far from being realized. 12 4 While globalization leads
to increased access for some, this is not true for most of the
developing world. 125 Therefore, bringing down prices is necessary
to provide access to essential medicines. Because the WHO
recognizes the TRIPS Agreement, any solution that the WHO
promotes will balance intellectual property rights with the urgency
of providing essential medicines to the developing world. 26
II. Analysis
A. Solutions Within the Framework of the TRIPS
Agreement
The current situation clearly shows that affirmative steps
must be taken to promote access to essential medicines. Lowering
the prices of these medicines is a crucial step in promoting
access. 127 Measures such as compulsory and voluntary licensing,
parallel importing, and generic manufacturing can be taken within
the framework of the TRIPS Agreement to help reduce prices
while still giving adequate protection to intellectual property law.
The issuance of Executive Order 13,155 increases the possibility
that such measures comply with the Agreement when taken by
governments of sub-Saharan African countries to address the
HIV/AIDS crisis. The manner in which the promotion of access to
essential medicines affects protection of human rights must also
be addressed. It is time to put aside the immediate benefits of
123. See Scholtz, supra note 17.
124. See Medecins Sans Frontieres Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines,
G8 Statement on Health, http://www.accessmed-msf.org (last visited Mar. 4, 2001)
(stating that "[i]nfectious and parasitic diseases, most notably HIV/AIDS,
[tuberculosis], and malaria, as well as childhood diseases and common infections,
threaten to reverse decades of development," and must therefore be combated).
125. See id.; see also Crossette, supra note 118 (noting that for the industrial
world, globalization is a chance to expand international standards of law, social
development, and human rights; however, for the developing world, it represents a
troublesome prospect that the U.N. is further aligning itself with the power
centers: big corporations and high technology).
126. See Brundtland, supra note 18.
127. See Joint UNAIDS-UNICEF SD-WHOIEDM Project, Essential Drugs Used
in the Care of People Living with HI: Sources and Prices,
http://www.unaids.org/publications/documentslhealthaccess/drugsl.doc (Feb. 2000)
(stating that treatment for HIV/AIDS is limited in developing countries because of
the high cost and inability to finance and purchase drugs).
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strict enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement in the sub-Saharan
African region and deal with the crisis at hand.
1. Current Position of the U.S. Government
Executive Order 13,155 issued by President Clinton on May
10, 2000, was a necessary response to the crisis in sub-Saharan
Africa. 128 The Order states that the United States will not seek to
revise the intellectual property laws of a sub-Saharan African
country that uses its domestic law to promote access to HIV/AIDS
pharmaceuticals for affected populations in its country.129
However, this Order includes the condition that sub-Saharan
African countries provide adequate and effective intellectual
property protection consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.'30
Executive Order 13,155 has positive implications for
countries in sub-Saharan Africa if parallel importing, compulsory
licensing, and generic manufacturing are used. 13' Although the
language of the TRIPS Agreement is ambiguous as to whether
these methods absolutely provide adequate protection for
intellectual property, it is clear that the methods do so in many
circumstances. 132 In light of this, sub-Saharan African countries
will be able to use such practices without fear of repercussions in
other areas of trade with the United States. 13
2. Compulsory Licensing
Several provisions in article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement
allow compulsory licensing. 34 Compulsory licensing involves use
of the patent without the authorization of the right holder if
128. See Exec. Order No. 13,155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521, 30,523 (May 20, 2000).
129. See id. at 30,521.
130. See id.
131. See Integrated Reg'l Info. Network, supra note 13 (quoting Medecins Sans
Frontieres: "When countries are barred from accessing low cost drugs due to the
exclusive marketing rights of the patent holder, international organisations should
actively support the efforts of developing countries to improve access through
parallel imports, and voluntary and compulsory licenses.").
132. See Improving Access to Medicines, supra note 3 (noting that granting of
voluntary licenses for limited use in poor countries and supporting compulsory
licenses are both compliant with the TRIPS Agreement).
133. See Ford, supra note 63, at 954 (reporting that the United States strongly
opposed South Africa's Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act
because it would allow the issuance of compulsory licenses and parallel importing
by the South African Health Minister; the United States argued that this law
would violate the TRIPS Agreement, which reflects the position of the U.S.
government before Executive Order 13,155).
134. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. XXXI; see also Ford, supra note
64, at 959.
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certain conditions are met. For example, a country must first
attempt to gain authorization from the right holder. 135  The
attempt must be based on reasonable terms and must fail within a
reasonable period of time. 136 If these conditions are met, the
government of a country needing access to the patented product
may grant a compulsory license by seizing the patent and
manufacturing a generic copy of the drug while paying the patent
holder a reasonable royalty. 137 The issuance of a compulsory
license often results in a sharp decrease in prices because of the
introduction of competition. 38
The language of the TRIPS Agreement is equivocal regarding
when compulsory licenses may be granted. 39 However, the
Agreement clearly includes five grounds for granting compulsory
licenses: refusal to deal, anti-competitive practices, non-
commercial use, dependent patents, and situations of emergency
and extreme urgency. 140 The HIV/AIDS crisis is undeniably a
situation of emergency and extreme urgency.' 4 ' It is estimated
that as many as one in three young women and one in seven young
men are infected with the HIV/AIDS virus in some areas. 142
Therefore, the crisis justifies the granting of compulsory licenses
in sub-Saharan Africa. 143 Furthermore, article 31(b) makes this
course of action more direct in situations of extreme urgency by
waiving the usual requirements of attempting to gain a voluntary
license. 44
135. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. XXXI, para. (b); see also Carlos
M. Correa, Patent Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE,
supra note 47, at 189, 208-16. By doing so, the country seeks a voluntary license
from the patent holder. See discussion infra Part II.A.3 (explaining voluntary
licensing).
136. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12; see also Correa, supra note 135, at
208-16.
137. See Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 31.
138. See Ford, supra note 63, at 946.
139. See id. at 970-7 1.
140. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. XXXI; Correa, supra note 135, at
212-13 (reporting that the grounds stated for granting compulsory licenses in the
TRIPS Agreement are only illustrative and other grounds, including public health
and nutrition, may be contemplated).
141. See discussion supra Part L.A (describing the devastating impact of
HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa).
142. See Boseley, supra note 5, at 14.
143. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. XXXI, para. (b); Correa, supra
note 135, at 210 (listing emergency and extreme urgency as grounds for granting
compulsory licenses under TRIPS).
144. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. XXXI, para. (b).
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Member countries use a case-by-case analysis to determine
whether a compulsory license should be granted. 145 Among the
factors considered, the countries examine the scope and duration
of the license and give preference for the domestic market. 146 The
extreme situation in sub-Saharan Africa lends support to these
factors. The HIV/AIDS antiretrovirals would be used in the
domestic market of sub-Saharan African countries where the rates
of infection are staggering. 147 Furthermore, the scope and the
duration of the compulsory licenses could be limited to the time it
takes to curb the spread of the virus.
The pharmaceutical companies disagree with the granting of
compulsory licenses, arguing that it takes profits away from
research and development and therefore reduces incentives to
create new pharmaceuticals. 48 The greatest loss of profits would
result if the pharmaceuticals being manufactured under a
compulsory license in sub-Saharan Africa were to drift back into
the United States and other markets via the gray market, causing
competition with the same drug being produced by the patent
holder. However, the United States and other developed countries
could enact strict penalties and a careful monitoring of
pharmaceutical imports to discourage this practice. While the
pharmaceutical industry is profit-oriented and HIV/AIDS drugs
have been developed from these profits,149 the time has come to
put the welfare of the twenty-five million people in the sub-
Saharan region suffering from AIDS ahead of the profits of the
pharmaceutical industry. 50 Rather than accepting the argument
that compulsory licensing should be prohibited because it leads to
declining profits, the governments of developed nations should
take proactive steps to protect the pharmaceutical industry by
aggressively dealing with the problems compulsory licensing may
cause.
145. See Correa, supra note 135, at 210.
146. See id. (identifying other conditions, such as, prior request, non-exclusive,
non-assignable, revocation, remuneration, and revision of decisions (validity of
remuneration)).
147. See discussion supra Part L.A (describing the devastating impact of
HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa).
148. See supra notes 70, 91-92 and accompanying text (stating that because the
development of new pharmaceuticals costs hundreds of millions of dollars, the
pharmaceutical companies favor charging high prices and oppose compulsory
licensing).
149. See supra note 70, 92 and accompanying text.
150. See AIDS Drugs: Activists March on White House, supra note 13 (marking
the release of documentation which showed several times where the U.S.
government placed drug company concerns above public health concerns).
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The sub-Saharan African national governments should make
a case for compulsory licenses of essential medicines within the
framework of the TRIPS Agreement.15 ' At the same time, the
United States and other countries that are home to multi-national
drug companies must allow a broader reading of article 31 of the
TRIPS Agreement when considering the issuance of compulsory
licenses in this situation. Executive Order 13,155 shows an
affirmative step in this direction by the U.S. government.
152
Finally, if countries grant compulsory licenses under the TRIPS
Agreement, the extreme strain that the HIV/AIDS crisis is causing
to the sub-Saharan countries' economies should be carefully
considered in deciding what the appropriate remuneration
required will be for the licenses. 153 Little or no remuneration
seems appropriate due to the dire financial situation in the sub-
Saharan region. 154
3. Voluntary Licensing
A patent holder may directly allow a foreign manufacturer to
use a patent by granting a voluntary license.1 55  Voluntary
licensing involves technology transfer and allows developing
nations to boost their economies by manufacturing certain
pharmaceuticals. Concomitantly, it allows the pharmaceutical
companies, as the patent holders, to retain a degree of control. 156
Thus, under a voluntary license, the pharmaceutical industry
could maintain control of the drug manufacturing and play a great
role in promoting access. 157
Sub-Saharan African countries may grant compulsory
licenses if a voluntary license is refused. 158 The grounds and
conditions considered by the pharmaceutical company in deciding
151. See supra note 140 (noting that the TRIPS Agreement allows compulsory
licensing of patents in certain situations).
152. See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text (noting that until May
2000, the United States strictly interpreted the TRIPS Agreement; however,
shortly after the issuance of Order 13,155, multi-national pharmaceutical
companies lowered prices for, and made donations of, certain drugs to developing
countries).
153. See World Trade Org., supra note 80.
154. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text (describing the dire financial
situation in sub-Saharan caused by HIV/AIDS).
155. See World Trade Org., supra note 80.
156. See Scholtz, supra note 17.
157. See Improving Access to Medicines, supra note 3 (stating that by granting
voluntary licenses, the pharmaceutical industry can allow a transfer of technology
that allows the developing nation to create industries capable of producing generic
medicines).
158. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (explaining compulsory licensing).
Law and Inequality
to grant the voluntary license would most likely be similar to that
involved in the decision of whether to grant a compulsory
license. 159 The terms of the decision include the appropriate
remuneration and the scope and duration of the license. 160
Therefore, it is in the best interest of a pharmaceutical company to
grant a voluntary license in order to retain greater control.
4. Parallel Imports
Parallel importing is another method that can be used to
lower prices of pharmaceuticals. 16 1 Parallel imports introduce
competition into the market and provide an incentive for
pharmaceutical companies to lower the prices of such
pharmaceuticals. 162 Similar to the issue of compulsory licensing,
the TRIPS Agreement is ambiguous regarding the issue of parallel
licensing. 163 Parallel importing appears to comply with the TRIPS
Agreement in that article 6 states, "nothing in this Agreement
shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual
property rights."'164 The debatable issue is whether the patent
holder's rights extend from the first sale of the product. Under the
"first sale doctrine" or "doctrine of exhaustion," the owner of the
property right benefits from the protection on the first sale of the
product, thereby allowing the first-sale buyer to resell the product
in competition with the patent holder without infringing on the
patent holder's rights. 65 The text of the TRIPS Agreement
purposely does not state that its protection extends beyond the
first sale of the product. 166 Because parallel imports involve only
159. See supra notes 140, 145-146 and accompanying text (listing the grounds
and conditions used to grant compulsory licenses).
160. See supra notes 145-146 and accompanying text (explaining that whether a
compulsory license should be granted requires a case-by-case analysis).
161. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (noting that parallel
importing could lower the price of medicines).
162. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (noting that parallel importing
increases competition, thereby lowering prices).
163. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (noting that the language of the
TRIPS Agreement may be interpreted to allow parallel importing); see also Claude
E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical
Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy, 10
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 190-91 (noting that the TRIPS
Agreement explicitly acknowledged a lack of consensus over the issue of exhaustion
of patents).
164. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 12, art. VI.
165. See Snyder, supra note 69, at 181 (explaining the first sale doctrine);
Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 163, at 190-93, 196-200 (explaining the
doctrine of exhaustion and discussing the arguments about whether parallel
imports comply with the TRIPS Agreement).
166. See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 163, at 191; see also Snyder, supra
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the importation of the drug from a country where the patent
holder sells the drug for less-and not the manufacturing of a drug
in violation of the patent-it is not in violation of the TRIPS
Agreement. 167
Arguments that the long-term detriment of prohibiting
parallel imports will outweigh the short-term benefits of allowing
them are based on patent law policy. This argument centers on
exhaustive patents, which provide heightened incentives for
pharmaceutical companies to engage in research and
development.168 If patents were exhaustive under the TRIPS
Agreement, the patent would extend beyond the first sale of the
drug and parallel importing would be a violation of the TRIPS
Agreement. However, as noted above, the drafters of the
Agreement purposely refrained from using language that would
have this effect.1 69 Therefore, the Agreement should be read to
allow parallel importing, which should be vigorously utilized to
introduce competition into foreign markets in order to lower prices
of essential pharmaceuticals.
Admittedly, allowing parallel importing presents a dilemma
because it may discourage differential pricing or price
discrimination by the pharmaceutical industry, which in itself is
beneficial to developing nations.1 70 Unfortunately, there is a risk
that allowing parallel imports would force pharmaceutical
companies to raise prices in developing countries in order to make
note 69, at 191, 197-98 (explaining the inconsistent positions countries take
regarding parallel imports and stating that a law that allows patented drugs to be
imported from other countries where the pharmaceutical companies sell them more
cheaply is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement).
167. See Snyder, supra note 69, at 197.
168. See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 163, at 197 (explaining that "under
current U.S. law the patent owner has the right to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the patented invention[,]" and noting
that "in general courts continue to uphold the territorial nature of the patent
against claims of universal exhaustion").
169. See supra notes 163-166 and accompanying text (noting that the TRIPS
Agreement explicitly acknowledges a lack of consensus over the issue of exhaustion
of patents and that the issue of parallel imports remains unresolved).
170. See Brundtland, supra note 18 ('Equity pricing means that the poor would
not have to pay the same price for life-saving drugs as those who are better off.");
see also Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 163, at 251 (explaining that
pharmaceutical companies may charge different prices to consumers based on their
geographic region and finding that pharmaceutical companies have reduced the.
prices of HIV/AIDS drugs by fifty to seventy-five percent in developing countries).
But see Snyder, supra note 69, at 182 (recognizing that nations have been "hesitant
to apply the first sale doctrine internationally due to the fear that importers would
re-direct goods from poorer countries to the countries where the price is higher, and
as a result, economically disadvantaged countries would be denied sufficient
supplies of goods and technology that are extremely beneficial").
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parallel importing less profitable.171 However, it is unlikely that
the negative impacts of an altered differential pricing scheme
would outweigh the positive effects of parallel importing because
parallel importers rely greatly on the value of domestic currencies,
a factor completely out of the control of the pharmaceutical
industry. 172 Furthermore, raising prices in developing nations to
prices equal to those in developed nations would most likely
eliminate the market completely. Pharmaceutical companies
simply cannot charge persons in sub-Saharan Africa, where the
majority of the people earn less than a dollar a day, the same price
as those in the developed world. 173
In addition, the United States can enact laws regulating the
importation of gray market goods. As in the context of compulsory
licensing, this is a way to deal with the possible unintended
consequences of parallel importing by protecting the interests of
the pharmaceutical industry while allowing sub-Saharan African
countries to undertake practices that will be effective in lowering
the prices of pharmaceuticals.
5. Generic Manufacturing
Generic manufacturing of pharmaceuticals also introduces
competition into the market and therefore lowers prices of
essential medicines; however, it cannot take place until the patent
has expired. A spokesperson for Medecins Sans Frontieres, Daniel
Berman, noted the success of generic manufacturing: "The few
developing countries that have achieved significant access for
people with AIDS have done so by aggressively pursuing generic
strategies." 174
For example, generic manufacturing has been highly
successful and has lowered the price of AIDS drugs by eighty
171. Cf. Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 163, at 251 ('Pharmaceutical
companies 'have an incentive to set lower prices in low-income countries as long as
parallel trade does not exit, so developing countries pay lower prices compared to
high-income countries."') (quoting Richard P. Rozek & Ruth Berkowitz, The Effects
of Patent Protection on the Prices of Pharmaceutical Products-Is Intellectual
Property Protection Raising the Drug Bill in Developing Countries?, 1 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 179, 215-16 (1998)).
172. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (noting that unauthorized dealers
exploit currency fluctuations by buying in a country where the currency is weak
and selling where that currency is strong).
173. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (noting that the WHO has left
certain HIV drugs off its Model List of Essential Drugs because they are
unaffordable).
174. Press Release, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Access to Treatment-Should We
Wait for Barcelona?, http://www.msf.org/advocacy/accessmed/reports/2000/07/
aidsconference/pr-wait.htm (July 12, 2000).
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percent in Brazil, where the government has allowed generic
manufacturing of quality drugs no longer under patent. 175 Brazil's
program implemented a policy of universal access to antiretroviral
drugs; the policy halved the number of AIDS deaths between 1996
and 1999.176 By government initiation, Brazil manufactured drugs
that were not protected by patent and that required the
infrastructure and knowledge that Brazil could develop. 177 Such a
model could work in sub-Saharan Africa. The developing countries
could create the appropriate infrastructure while the patent is still
in effect so that the generic production could begin immediately
upon expiration. Or, as in Brazil, the nations of sub-Saharan
Africa could immediately produce drugs not under patent
protection. Moreover, the TRIPS Agreement allows a concession
for developing countries and allows them a grace period before
requiring compliance with the Agreement. 178 Under this grace
period, some of the AIDS drugs are not under patent in many sub-
Saharan African countries and their generic manufacturing could
be undertaken immediately. 179
A final option is to use the "bolar exception" to patent laws,
which permits a firm to test generic drugs in order to prepare for
marketing approval prior to the expiration of the patent. 80 The
process is useful because it ensures the timely introduction of
competition into the market when the patent expires.' 8 ' Sub-
Saharan African countries could begin this immediately.
Compulsory and voluntary licensing, parallel importing, and
generic manufacturing are all ways of introducing competition into
the market and will therefore have the impact of lowering drug
prices in the developing world.'8 2 Since the issuance of Executive
Order 13,155, the United States is more willing to allow these
practices and consider them in accord with the TRIPS
175. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting that the cost of such drugs
fell only nine percent before the implementation of generic drugs).
176. See supra note 88.
177. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (explaining how Brazil has
used generic manufacturing of pharmaceuticals to increase competition and lower
prices).
178. See Rosenberg, supra note 43, at 31.
179. See supra notes 101-107 and discussion supra Part II.A.1 (noting that the
United States will not seek to revise intellectual property rules of sub-Saharan
African countries that use their domestic law to promote access to HIV/AIDS
medicines, though the United States wants those countries to abide by the TRIPS
Agreement).
180. See Trans Atl. Consumer Dialogue, supra note 71.
181. See id.
182. See discussion supra Part II.A.2-5 (describing the methods to lower prices of
drugs and arguing that the methods may fall within the TRIPS Agreement).
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Agreement. 183 The developing world should act promptly in order
to benefit from this policy.
B. Initiatives Recently Taken by World Organizations
The World Bank and the U.N. have been instrumental in
developing programs to address the HIV/AIDS crisis. 84 The
World Bank recently agreed to lend African governments money to
implement a Multi-Sector HIV/AIDS program. 185 The overall
objective of the program is to increase access to HIV/AIDS
prevention, care, and treatment programs. 186  This program
represents a positive response on behalf of the governments of
African nations and international organizations.
In addition, the U.N. recognized that public health is closely
linked to human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.187 Article 25(1) of the Declaration states: "Everyone has a
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being
of himself and his family, including... medical care and necessary
social services, and the right to security in the event of...
sickness, disability ... or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control."'188 Moreover, UNAIDS has noted that the link
between public health and human rights is essential not only to
ensure that those with AIDS are cared for, but also that people's
vulnerability to infection is decreased. 189 Thus, the protection of
human rights is not adequate without both ensuring the health of
individuals and populations and directly addressing the AIDS
plague.190
Extending the relation of public health to human rights
strengthens the argument of the U.N. Declaration. Most societies
include as fundamental human rights the rights to privacy,
183. See discussion supra Part II.A.1 (arguing that Executive Order No. 13,155
should allow sub-Saharan countries to reproduce certain drugs without
repercussions from the United States).
184. See discussion supra Part I.B and accompanying text (identifying the
primary organizations involved in battling the international HIV/AIDS crisis).
185. See World Bank, supra note 42.
186. See id.
187. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948); see also Intellectual
Property, supra note 70.
188. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 187.
189. See Health: Activists to Push for Human Rights of HIVIAIDS Patients,
INT'L PRESS SERV., July 9, 2000, 2000 WL 4091946.
190. See Lawrence 0. Gostin & Zita Lazzrini, Human Rights and Public Health
in the AIDS Pandemic, 13 ISSUES L. & MED. 358, 358 (1997).
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equality, dignity, and security of persons. 191 In a country where so
many citizens are suffering from this debilitating illness that
ultimately results in death, these secured rights have little
practical reality. In other words, AIDS and the lack of treatment
infringe upon protected human rights by depriving individuals of
health and life to enjoy these fundamental rights. 192
Because the TRIPS Agreement focuses primarily on economic
interests, it has been criticized for failing to give adequate weight
to human rights by making prices of HIV/AIDS drugs
unaffordable. 93 Thus, the Agreement as currently interpreted
trammels on a basic human right to public health. The United
States can play a substantial role in promoting public health by
allowing the practices discussed above and not sanctioning
countries for possible violations of the TRIPS Agreement. 194
III. Conclusion
Intellectual property rights and patent protection are
necessary to the success and innovation of the multi-national
pharmaceutical industry. 95 The expense of such patents to the
developing world, however, must also be taken into account.
Currently, people in sub-Saharan Africa suffering from the
HIV/AIDS pandemic do not have access to essential medicines. It
is a very complex problem and cannot be attributed to any one
factor. However, relaxing the protection of intellectual property
clearly will lower the prices of pharmaceuticals and promote
access. 9 6  Methods to help lower prices include compulsory
licensing, voluntary licensing, parallel importing, and generic
manufacturing.19 7 Both the pharmaceutical industry and the U.S.
government can promote access to these methods while still
adequately protecting intellectual property rights.
191. See Health: Activists to Push for Human Rights of HIVIAIDS Patients,
supra note 189 (noting that drawing the parallel between human rights and public
health requires using rights that are already enshrined in the law).
192. See Intellectual Property, supra note 70; see also International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
193. See Intellectual Property, supra note 70.
194. See discussion supra Parts II.A.2-5 (describing the methods to lower prices
of drugs and arguing that the methods may fall within the TRIPS Agreement).
195. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (stating that drug companies
claim to spend around $500 million for the development of a new drug).
196. See discussion supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the relaxing of intellectual
property laws by the United States in Executive Order 13,155).
197. See discussion supra Parts II.A.2-5 (describing the methods to lower prices
of drugs and arguing that the methods may fall within the TRIPS Agreement).
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Of the possible mechanisms, compulsory licensing is the
method most likely to promote effective changes. Because
compulsory licensing is specifically addressed in the text of the
TRIPS Agreement and is permitted in Executive Order 13,155,
sub-Saharan African countries would face less opposition if they
implemented compulsory licensing plans. 198 The lesser likelihood
of legal and political repercussions is important because it allows
governments of sub-Saharan African countries to use compulsory
licensing to promote access to pharmaceuticals without interfering
with their ability to trade with developed countries in areas
unrelated to pharmaceuticals - trade that is essential to their
survival. Furthermore, pharmaceutical companies do not have a
legal argument to stop compulsory licensing if it is done within the
framework of the TRIPS Agreement.
The pharmaceutical industry must also be cognizant of the
very real possibility that if the HIV/AIDS crisis continues to grow
and the situation becomes more and more desperate, the
governments of these sub-Saharan African countries may decide to
offer less protection to intellectual property rights and patents. 199
The TRIPS Agreement was entered into mainly for the benefit of
developed nations. 200 The developing world has made efforts to
comply with the Agreement in order to avoid sanctions in
unrelated areas of trade. 20 1 Eventually, this trade-off may become
198. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the advantages of using
compulsory licenses to reduce the cost of necessary drugs).
199. See Yusuf, supra note 47, at 4 (explaining that the disparity in
industrialization between nations has historically resulted in differences in scope of
protection of intellectual property); see also Rowe, supra note 41, at 109 ("The
varied economic and social backgrounds of participating nations, coupled with the
vast amounts of money at stake in international treaty making, cause problems
when nations attempt to draft uniform intellectual property treaties."). A
developing country's unwillingness to enforce patent protection is explained by the
following:
[A]t a stage when the technological capacity of a particular
country is weak, and its enterprises are not able to take
significant advantage of its incentive provided by intellectual
property protection, the benefits gained from such protection
(including the incremental contribution to technological
progress world-wide) may be outweighed by the disadvantage of
not being able to acquire and adapt foreign technology without
reference to its creator, or to import new products and processes
from alternative or cheaper sources.
Yusuf, supra note 47, at 4.
200. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. The value of a patent system
to the developing world remains controversial. See supra notes 73-76 and
accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (discussing how the strict
enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement would greatly harm the economies of the
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too great and the region will be forced to take any measures
necessary to curb the spread of the HIV virus, including not
honoring pharmaceutical patents and intellectual property rights.
The HIV/AIDS crisis has spread to catastrophic levels
already. Something must be done immediately to alleviate the
suffering and deaths of millions. The urgency of the situation is
apparent. If the compassion for millions of people dying without
access to treatment is not enough motivation, the developed world
must realize that the resultant instability of the African continent
caused by the health crisis will affect the entire world, not just the
sub-Saharan region. 202 The solutions noted above offer adequate
protection of intellectual property rights, yet promote access to
essential medicines.
countries in the developing world).
202. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.

